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a unifying model of power indices as expected decisiveness, which shows that the defining 
feature of each approach is a particular distribution of the voting poll. Empirical evidence 
drawn from voting situations, in addition to a consideration of first principles, leads us to 
reject one of these approaches. The unified formulation allows us to develop useful related 
concepts of efficiency and blocking leverage, previously used solely by a 'Banzhaf' approach, 
for the case of Shapley-Shubik, and a comparison of results is shown. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two major ‘classical’ measures of voting power: the Shapley-Shubik power indices 
and the Banzhaf power indices. The Shapley-Shubik index, which was the first to be 
proposed, arose out of co-operative game theory. A small set of plausible axioms has been 
shown to be sufficient to characterise this index uniquely. Originally the Banzhaf approach 
was put forward as a heuristic measure, but has subsequently been ‘axiomatised’ in a similar 
fashion. We will dispense with the usual literature references here, as our approach will 
leave the game-theoretic background to one side, in part because there would appear to be 
sometimes strong opinions, but a lack of a compelling consensus, as to the merits of these 
axiomatic approaches. 
Straffin (1997 and 1982) put forward an original characterisation of the power indices using a 
probabilistic approach. Starting out from basic assumptions about an individual’s voting 
behaviour Straffin was able to show that Banzhaf indices arise from an independence 
assumption: the probability  i p  of voting ‘for’, say, being selected independently from the 
uniform distribution on [] 1 , 0  for each player/voter i , and that the Shapley-Shubik indices 
arise from a homogeneity assumption: a number  p  being selected from the uniform 
distribution on [ ] 1 , 0 , and that  p pi =  for all i . 
The approach in this paper draws its inspiration from Straffin, but it focuses in contrast on the 
probabilistic distribution of voting outcomes rather than the assumptions about voting 
behaviour as inputs. 
Voting power indices have been applied and studied in the context of many voting situations, 
notably to analyse national elections in many countries, but also in the context of the United 
Nations Security Council, and voting rights in companies, to name but a few examples. We 
surmise, however, that the various deliberations of the European Union (in Amsterdam, in 
Nice, in the Convention and at the adoption of the Constitution in Brussels in June 2004) with 
the purpose of reforming its major voting system in the Council of Ministers – the institution 
which determines the power of individual member states – has given rise to the largest 
single body of literature on power indices and a renewed interest in all aspects of voting 
power. 
A great variety of arguments have been put forward in the literature, of a game-theoretic 
nature or otherwise, on the respective merits or supposed deficiencies of the Shapley-Shubik 
and Banzhaf measures (as well as writers calling their appropriateness and usefulness per 
se into question!). Despite this, it can be noted from a practical viewpoint that the difference 
in results obtained by both approaches is usually only marginal. However, there are 2 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
important cases in which the results do in fact differ dramatically. One such case is for 
‘oceanic’ games involving a few ‘large’ players (in terms of their voting weight, and very 
many small players (e.g. stockholders in a company). Another remarkable difference in their 
respective results concerns the division of power between the President, the Senate and the 
Congress of the U.S.A. The Shapley-Shubik model attributes 50 % power to the President, 
but the Banzhaf approach attributes a mere 4 %. The corresponding power in Senate and 
Congress is 25 %, 25 % and 31 %, 65 % respectively.  
Perhaps a uniquely high level of interest has been shown by the many economists and 
political scientists who have made contributions in recent years to the assessment of power 
in the European Union. Similar comments about the marginal differences shown in results 
gained from both approaches to the analysis of voting power in the Council of Ministers also 
applied … that is, up until the emergence of so-called double-majority systems, These 
require both a qualified majority of the number of states to be greater than a given threshold 
value, and the total population of states in favour to exceed a given percentage quota of the 
population of the whole EU. As is indeed now known, just such a system has been adopted 
in the text of its Constitutional Treaty, upon which the European Union is now embarking on 
its ratification process throughout the various 25 member states. It turns out that the results 
from the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf calculations for the Council of Ministers as specified in 
the EU treaty differ to an enormous, and not ignorable, extent.  
The difference in results in illustrated here in terms of a non-parametric measure, the power 
gradient. (See section 5.2 for details). The power gradient is a summary statistic that relates 
the “degree of overall proportionality” between the power index of a player (member state) 
and its share of the total EU population. It is calibrated on a scale between 0 - 100 %: zero 
applies if all member states have equal power; 100 % applies if the power share is exactly 
equal to the population share of each member state. 
Whereas the difference in power gradient between Shapley-Shubik and (normalised) 
Banzhaf indices is typically only of the order of between 5 - 7 percentage points, the power 
gradient using the Shapley-Shubik measure is 32 percentage points higher than for the 
Banzhaf measure when applied to the EU of currently 25 member states, and 27 percentage 
points higher in the EU of 27 (with Romania and Bulgaria). 
This irreconcilable order of difference poses a particular problem (once again) and puts 
some questions into sharp focus: which of these classical measures of power do we accept? 
in which power index should results be reported? The answer cannot be one of coexisting 
measures, analogous to measures of, say, money-supply. The latter rest on well-defined I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 3 
differing factual contexts whereas the power indices claim to measure the same 
characteristic, namely voting power, uniquely.
1 Both would appear to be based on certain 
differing fundamental assumptions, between which we should be called upon to make a 
judgement. 
It is sufficient to note that no consensus has appeared, mainly because of the lack of, as yet, 
a common yardstick with which the different approaches may be evaluated. We propose in 
this paper a common framework for the two main power indices (and perhaps others), and 
come to a conclusion on their respective appropriateness in the light of empirical evidence 
and a consideration of first principles. 
2. Voting Games 
Formally a voting body is represented as a set N , which contains all n  members in the 
voting body. The notion of a simple game was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
in 1944. A simple voting game is an n-person game which can be defined as a pair  ) , ( ω N  
which satisfies conditions (i) - (iii)  
i.  ω φ ∈  
ii.  ω ∈ N  
iii. If  ω ∈ S and  S T ⊃  , then  ω ∈ T . 
In a simple game a coalition S  can have a value 0 or 1. If S is winning it has a value of 1, 
otherwise  S  has a value of 0 (all losing coalitions). The characteristic function v for a 
coalition indicates the value of S :  1 ) ( = S v , if S  is winning, otherwise  0 ) ( = S v . 
2.1 The Shapley-Shubik Power Index 
The Shapley-Shubik power index φ  was introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 
the 1950s (Shapley and Shubik 1954). The index is based on the Shapley value introduced 
by Lloyd Shapley (Shapley 1953). Shapley and Shubik came up with the idea that the 
                                                       
1 We ignore here certain attempts to characterise the power indices as essentially measuring different phenomena 
(e.g. Felsenthal et al. (1998) and consider the meaning of so-called “P-power” and “I-power” as being vacuous. 4 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
Shapley value could be used in simple games. In their article Shapley and Shubik (1954) 
introduce a voting scheme as well as the idea of being the pivotal or decisive voter. The 
calculation is based on all possible voter permutations, from which all the pivotal positions for 
a voter i  is analyzed. The sum of all the pivotal positions is divided by all possible orderings 
(voter permutations) giving voter i 's share on all pivots. Formally, voter i 's Shapley-Shubik 
index value may also be formulated in terms of swings: 
() {} () [] ( ) ( )
!
! ! 1
n
l n l
i S v S v
N S
i
− −
⋅ − − = ∑
⊆
φ  where  S l =  
The summation is thus over all negative swings, i.e. a non-zero contribution to the sum is 
obtained only when S is winning, but  { } () i S −  is losing. 
2.2 The Banzhaf Power Index  
The (absolute) Banzhaf (or Penrose) Index β of a simple game  ) , ( ω N is defined without 
considering orderings, but in terms of (negative) swings it is: 
( ) { } ( ) [ ]
1 2 −
⊆ ∑ − −
=
n
N S
i
i S v S v
β  
The summation is thus over all negative swings for player i . 
2.3 General definition of Power in terms of Decisiveness 
In the following we set out a simple general definition of voting power that encompasses the 
major power indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf. The output of a yes/no voting process 
may be regarded in terms of the number (or percentage) of participants who vote in favour of 
the proposition to be decided. We call this the voting poll, or poll. Note that this output does 
not necessarily determine the final outcome of the vote: for example, 62 % in favour leads to 
the decision being accepted under simple majority, but to rejection when a two-thirds 
majority is required. The term “poll” is familiar in the contexts of opinion polls, or exit polls, 
used in the same sense. 
Definition:  The voting power of a player (participant, committee member, voter) is the 
expected decisiveness of her vote for a given distribution of the voting poll. I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 5 
In formal terms: 
The decisiveness  i d  of a player for a particular poll ( n l ≤ ≤ 0 votes in favour) is the 
potential of her vote (for/against) being critical to the outcome of the voting decision. The 
potential may then be assessed on the basis of the probabilities applied to possible polling 
behaviours. 
Considering outcome sets  l S  that have exactly l  players voting in favour and the set 
{} { } S i if i S and S i if i S Si ∉ ∪ ∈ − =
∗ , then 
() ( ) ( ) ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
− = ∑
∈
∗
l
n
S v S v l d
l S S
i i  
Decisiveness is thus the share of combinations (coalitions) that are +/- swings for each 
player  i. We note from the above definition that decisiveness  i d  depends only on the 
parameters of the voting game (e.g. voting weights and the threshold that defines a winning 
coalition or majority), and not on any probabilistic aspects – in particular it is identical in any 
particular game for the Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf approaches. 
The (voting) poll distribution  ( ) n l l p ..., , 0 , =  returns the assumed probability of there 
being l  votes in favour (and likewise  ) ( l n −  against). For large n  the distribution may take 
the continuous form on a scale of 0-100 percent. These probabilities have been assessed 
using the Principle of Indifference or Principle of Insufficient Reason for each of the Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf models, but significantly in different ways. 
The expected decisiveness  i δ  of player i  for a poll distribution  ( ) l p  is thus: 
∑
=
=
⋅ =
n l
l
i i l p l d
0
) ( ) ( δ  
Voting power indices are thus solely differentiated by the poll distribution  () l p . For 
  Shapley-Shubik:   () n l
n
l pSh ,..., 0 ,
1
1
=
+
=  6 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
    i.e. a uniform distribution of poll outcomes on { } n ,..., 0 , and for 
  (absolute) Banzhaf:  () n l
l
n
l
n
l
n
l p n
n
l
aB ,..., 0 , 2
0
= ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
= ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∑
=
 
    i.e. a binomial distribution on { } n ,..., 0  with probability 
2
1
= . 
Theorem 1 (Unifying Voting Poll Property): 
i. The  Shapley-Shubik  voting power index of player i  is the expected decisiveness 
under equi-likelihood (unbiased) “random” polling and is given by 
()
() () () ∑∑
∑ ∑
=
=∈
∗
=
=
=
=
= + ⋅ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
− =
+
⋅ = ⋅ =
n l
l
i
S S
i
n l
l
i
n l
l
Sh i
Sh
i
n
l
n
S v S v
n
l d l p l d
l 0
0 0
1
1
1
) ( ) (
φ
δ
 
ii.  The absolute Banzhaf voting power index of player i  is the expected decisiveness 
under binomial polling and is given by 
()
() () ∑∑
∑ ∑
=
=∈
∗
=
=
=
=
= − =
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅ = ⋅ =
n l
l
i
n
S S
i
n l
l
n
i
n l
l
aB i
aB
i
l
S v S v
l
n
l d l p l d
0
0 0
2
2 ) ( ) (
β
δ
 
Proof: Similar to Straffin (1977). 
i.  () () () ∑∑
=
=∈
∗ + ⋅ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
n l
lS S
i n
l
n
S v S v
l 0
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() { } () [] {} () ( ) [] () ∑∑ ∑
=
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⎝
⎛
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⎨
⎧
− + + − − =
n l
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transforming sets T  where  1 − = l T  
() { } () [] () ( ) { } () [] () 1
1
1
0 0
+ ⋅ ⎟ ⎟
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−
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1
 
 
() {} () [] ( ) ( )
i
N S ! n
! l n ! l
i S v S v φ =
− −
⋅ − − = ∑
⊆
1
 
ii.  () () ∑∑
=
=∈
∗ = −
n l
l
n
S S
i
l
S v S v
0
2
  () { } () [] {} () ( ) [] ∑∑ ∑
=
=∈ ∈ ⎪ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
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n
S S S S l l
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0
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N S
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⊆
2 2  
 
Remark: Because  1
1 1
= =∑ ∑
= =
n
i
i
n
i
Sh
i φ δ  , a well-known property, the Shapley-Shubik power 
indices may itself also be treated as defining a probability distribution over all players: the 
power index is then the probability of a player having decisive power. A corresponding 
statement is not true for the absolute Banzhaf power index, as it does not in general sum to 
unity. 8 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
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2.4 Example 
Consider the 4-person game {} 7 ; 1 , 2 , 3 , 5 , i.e. a threshold of 7 weighted votes are needed to 
pass a decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The calculations for the voting power index of the player with weight 3 are illustrated in the 
above diagram. The starting point for both Shapley-Shubik and (absolute) Banzhaf 
calculations is the list of coalitions, as shown in the second column of the table. Both indices 
also share the same decisiveness function shown in the column marked (a). The indices 
differ only in the probability distributions shown in columns labelled (c) and (d) respectively. 
Alongside the power indices, other measures introduced later in this paper are indicated. 
The diagram shows the calculation of efficiency and also the blocking leverage of the player 
with weight 3 for the Shapley-Shubik approach.   I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 9 
3. Which Power Index to Choose in the Light of our 
Model of Expected Decisiveness?  
3.1 Empirical Evidence of ‘Random’ versus Binomial Polling 
The previous section has shown that the classical Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power 
indices may be unified under the probabilistic model of expected decisiveness. In this 
formulation there is a clear difference between these two approaches. In the Shapley-Shubik 
approach, the underlying poll distribution (i.e. the distribution of the number of players voting 
for a decision) is uniform or “random”, whereas it is binomial (with probability = ½) in the 
Banzhaf model. Note the contrast when these approaches are characterised in terms of 
voting behaviour instead of poll outcome: Banzhaf models exhibit ‘random’ voting, giving rise 
to a uniform distribution of individual voting configurations, whereas Shapley-Shubik models 
exhibit ‘homogeneous’ voting, giving rise to what could be termed an ‘inverse binomial’ 
distribution of individual voting configurations. The Principle of Insufficient Reason is applied 
to the poll distribution in the Shapley-Shubik model, but to the voting configuration (of 
‘named’ voters) in the Banzhaf model. We can now ask: which approach, using which 
assumption, is appropriate? 
Two recent papers (Gelman, Katz and Bafumi 2002, Gelman, Katz and Tuerlinckx 2002) 
have been devoted to wide-ranging empirical testing of voting power, using data from U.S. 
State House, U.S. State Senate, U.S. Congressional, U.S. Senate, as well as European 
national elections. Regarding this as a source of data, it can be pointed out that elections 
with typically half a million upwards of an electorate represents a large ‘committee’ faced with 
for/against, yes/no-type decisions. (Multi-party elections do not play a significant part in this 
debate). A well-known property of the binomial distribution is its rapid convergence to 
approximation to a Normal distribution with standard deviation proportional to  n , the 
number of voters (players), so that the Banzhaf model predicts an ever tighter clustering of 
the proportion of voters voting ‘for’ a decision, say, within two standard deviations of a central 
mean of  2 n  as n  increases. Such a tendency should therefore be particularly in evidence 
in elections where n  is very large. 
When Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2002) claim in their empirical analysis that “Standard 
Voting Power Indices Don’t Work”
2 they are referring to the Banzhaf power indices, as they 
make clear. They point out that voting power indices such as that of absolute Banzhaf are 
derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e. 
random voting) and that from this assumption it can be derived that the probability of a vote 
being decisive in a jurisdiction with n voters is proportional to  n 1 . In testing, and rejecting 
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this hypothesis empirically, using data from several different U.S. and European elections 
they find instead that the probability of a decisive vote is approximately proportional to  n 1 .  
Now a vote in a simple majority election is theoretically decisive when the balance of voters 
‘for’ and ‘against’ is 50-50. The voter in this position of balance is one out of n  voters, so 
that under the uniform poll distribution associated, as we have seen, with the Shapley-
Shubik model, the probability of the vote being decisive is  ( ) 1 1 + n , which is of course 
proportional to  n 1  for large n . With any fixed poll distribution the probability of a vote being 
decisive is proportional to  n 1 , in fact. Experiments with the triangular poll distribution, for 
example, return power indices “close to” the Shapley-Shubik indices. Thus the empirical 
findings of Gelman et al. not only lead to a rejection of the Banzhaf or “coin-flip” model, but 
we observe that these findings also show strong support for the Shapley-Shubik model. 
Gelman et al. also turn their attention to the recurring claim that, in the voting system for the 
President of the United States, the Electoral College benefits voters in large states (at the 
expense of voters in smaller states). For example, Banzhaf (1968) claims to offer “a 
mathematical demonstration” that it “discriminates against voters in the small and middle-
sized states by giving the citizens of the large states an excessive amount of voting power, ” 
and Brams and Davis (1974) claim that the voter in a large state “has on balance greater 
potential voting power … than a voter in a small state. ” Gelman et al. conclude that the most 
important political implication of their result is that proportionally weighted voting systems 
(that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes proportional to n ) are basically fair, and that 
this contradicts the claim in the voting power literature that weights should be approximately 
proportional to  n  (the so-called “square-root rule”). We concur with these authors, as a 
consequence of our insights into the Shapley-Shubik model. 
There is a deal of similarity between the ‘asymmetric’ voting system of American Electoral 
College and the Council of the European Union, in terms of voting weights that are (more or 
less) degressively proportional to population size. In the days leading up to the decision 
taken to adopt the European Constitution in June 2004, a leading group of voting power 
experts addressed a letter the European Governments and European institutions which 
called for voting weights of member states to be based on the square-root rule. We pose the 
open question of whether these scientists would continue such support this demand when 
armed with the knowledge that it is based on tacit acceptance of the Banzhaf model, but 
which loses its validity upon acceptance of the Shapley-Shubik model.  I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 11 
Further evidence of the untenability of the square-root rule has been given in the recent US 
Presidential Election (2004). Many observers
3 believe that the narrow avoidance of the same 
outcome in the close-run race as happened in 2000, namely a win for a candidate whose 
party received less votes than another, shows that the Electoral College system is 
unacceptable. In fact, if apportionment of members of the Electoral College did indeed follow 
the square-root rule, the Republican victory could have been secured without winning the 
large states Florida and Texas, with states whose combined population is only 38 % of the 
total US population, as opposed to the 51  % of population that “red” states actually 
comprised!
4 So application of the square-root theory would fly in the face of commonly held 
beliefs about democracy: this theory is the direct corollary of the Banzhaf voting power 
model. 
It should be mentioned that Leech (2002) found in a study of corporate shareholding in UK 
results that support Banzhaf voting power and fail for Shapley-Shubik power indices. That 
study compares the power indices respectively to independent analyses of shareholder 
voting power related to the separation of ownership and control. It is not clear to us whether 
this criterion is indeed sufficiently indicative as a means of hypothesis testing. 
3.2 Expected Decisiveness and Logical Probability. 
The entry contributed by Alan Hacek on logical probability in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy
5 reminds us that along with its early proponent Keynes (1921) by far the most 
systematic study of logical probability was by Carnap (1950) and that his formulation of 
logical probability begins with the construction of a formal language. It states:  
“Carnap argues for his favored measure “m*” by insisting that the only thing that significantly 
distinguishes individuals from one another is some qualitative difference, not just a difference 
in labeling. Call a structure description a maximal set of state descriptions, each of which can 
be obtained from another by some permutation of the individual names. m* assigns each 
structure description equal measure, which in turn is divided equally among their constituent 
state descriptions. It gives greater weight to homogenous state descriptions than to 
heterogeneous ones, thus ‘rewarding’ uniformity among the individuals in accordance with 
putatively reasonable inductive practice.” 
 
 
                                                       
3 For example, a leader published in the International Herald Tribune one week after the election. 
4 Paterson, I., IHS Working Paper (to appear). 
5 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#3.2 12 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
As an example:  
The measure m* assigns numbers to the state descriptions as follows: first, every structure 
description is assigned an equal weight, 1/4; then, each state description belonging to a given 
structure description is assigned an equal part of the weight assigned to the structure 
description: 
State description    Structure description     Weight     m*  
1. Fa.Fb.Fc     I. Everything is F      1/4     1/4  
 
2.  Fa.Fb.Fc               1/12   
3. Fa.Fb.Fc     II. Two Fs, one ¬F     1/4     1/12  
4.  Fa.Fb.Fc               1/12   
 
5.  Fa.  Fb.Fc               1/12   
6. Fa.Fb.Fc     III. One F, two ¬Fs     1/4     1/12  
7.  Fa.  Fb.Fc               1/12   
 
8. Fa. Fb.Fc     IV. Everything is ¬F     1/4     1/4  
Notice that m* gives greater weight to homogenous state descriptions than to heterogeneous 
ones…. 
 
 
Curiously, the Weight in this example could serve exactly for the probability  () l pSh  and the 
measure m* for  () l p
'
Sh , the individual coalition probability (c.f. section 4), in our expected 
decisiveness model of Shapley-Shubik voting power. Notwithstanding this coincidence, it 
serves to illustrate that it is legitimate to consider that the appropriate level to apply the so-
called Principle of Indifference or Principle of Insufficient Reason can be the poll outcome, 
and need not be incontrovertibly at the “atomistic” level of voting behaviours, as is implicit in 
all Banzhaf-type models. I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 13 
There will surely be adherents of the atomistic line of thinking who insist that the free choice 
of voters in a voting game (that admittedly exists) must lead ‘naturally’ to the uniform 
distribution over voting coalition outcomes  ( ) l paB
' . We offer a reply based on Franklin’s 
(2001) paper. In his claim that “[Karl] Popper was a secret logical probabilist” he notes that  
“Popper claimed … that theories should be “contentful” or “testable” and aim to survive 
“rigorous” or “severe” tests. The natural interpretation of these claims, though one resisted by 
official Popperian ideology, is that it is a good thing for a theory (in short, it increases the 
theory’s probability substantially) if it is initially improbable, but predicts something that would 
be unlikely if it were false.”
6 
 
In our case, the Shapley-Shubik model admits the possibility that any election result (say, of 
a “yes/no” referendum) is possible and assigns equal a priori probability to each poll result. 
The fact that indeed a large range of election/referendum poll results are observed in 
practice increases our likelihood of acceptance of this approach. If the Shapley-Shubik 
approach is false (because the correct model is Banzhaf) then referendum results of 79 %, 
42 %, etc. even 53 % , for example, would occur with near-zero frequency with an electorate 
of millions.
7 This is patently not the case. And there being less than 5 or 6 states in 
favour/against a decision in EU25 would be outwith the 99 % confidence level! Thus the 
empirical evidence and a consideration of first principles leads to a rejection of the Banzhaf 
model. 
Why it should be (as we believe) that in most voting situations where voters exercise their 
individual right to vote independently, the results tend to exhibit ‘random poll’ and not 
‘random voting’ behaviour, is a matter for conjecture. Perhaps it lies in the fact that each vote 
is taken on a particular issue that is in common for each player, so that their polling 
behaviour is a reflection of the ‘society’ of which they consist. Sometimes there will be a low 
degree of concurrence, sometimes a high degree of concurrence, sometime a very high 
degree, sometimes there will be a rough balance etc. On the one hand we cannot a priori 
predict what the balance in the group/society will be for a particular unknown issue. On the 
other hand, the vote on a particular decision will give rise to group result, the voting poll, and 
it is precisely because this poll result is unknown that we invoke the Principle of Insufficient 
Reason. Indeed, the existence such a phenomenon – namely, that there is an underlying poll 
tendency on a particular issue, which is the group phenomenon to be uncovered – is the 
basis for the pervasiveness and utility of opinion polls. Random voting, on the contrary, 
                                                       
6 Note: for a “theory’s probability” here should not be confused with our use of probability in voting power models. 
7 In an electorate of 5 million, for example, the result will lie between 49.96 % - 50.04 % (95 % c.l.). 14 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
would imply that the voters were oblivious to the issue at hand, voting effectively as 
automatons, and that nearly all polls would split 50-50. We could indeed postulate an  
Axiom of Social Choice: Voting in a group decision follows, a priori, a random poll model. 
4. Related ‘Shapley-Shubik’ measures 
The probability distribution  () l p  is defined over equal poll outcomes i.e. with l  players 
voting in favour. (Note that the poll outcome is not the same as the vote outcome: in a 
weighted voting game, different combinations of l  players will in general have a different 
combined strength of vote.) The poll distribution is testable in practice, as discussed above. 
We may alternatively consider the corresponding distribution over the possible combinations 
of ‘individual’ voting behaviour,  () ( ) l p S p
' ' =  where S l = , This distribution is rarely made 
available in practice, and even for moderate-sized n  the large number of combinations 
makes hypothesis testing difficult. We may however write 
() ()
()
() ! 1
! !
1
1 '
+
⋅ −
= ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
+
=
n
l l n
l
n
n
S pSh  and  ()
n aB S p
2
1 ' = , where  S l =  and the 
voting power index formulas may be formulated as 
  () () () S p S v S v Sh
N S
i
Sh
i
' ⋅ − = ∑
∈
∗ δ  and  () ( ) () S p S v S v aB
N S
i
aB
i
' ⋅ − = ∑
∈
∗ δ . 
4.1 Efficiency 
The topic of efficiency (also appearing under a variety of other names, such as ‘workability’) 
entered prominently into the discussions on the voting system of the Council of Ministers of 
the EU in the years prior to the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. Leaving aside the 
appropriateness of the name, efficiency turns out to be Coleman’s (1971) index on the power 
of a collectivity to act. This index indicates the ability of the voting body to pass a bill. In a 
voting body of n  members there are always 
n 2  different coalition possibilities (voter 
combinations) favouring the passage (including the empty coalition as well as the grand 
coalition) and the complementary coalitions consisting of the remaining voters. Using the 
characteristic function we can measure the efficiency as I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 15 
n
N S
S v 2 ) ( ∑
∈
  [Coleman power of a collectivity to act] 
in other words the fraction of coalitions that are winning coalitions. 
This definition of efficiency is enticingly ‘obvious’ – until it is realised that in probabilistic 
terms it is a ‘Banzhaf’-type function, i.e. the same assumption – namely, that each coalition 
has exactly the same probability – underlies it, just as is made in calculating the (absolute) 
Banzhaf power indices. 
Definition 1 (Efficiency): 
The generalisation of the concept of efficiency is simply the probability of coalitions being 
winning coalitions 
( ) S p S v Eff
N S
' ) ( ⋅ = ∑
∈
 
so that  
( )
() ! 1
! !
) (
+
⋅ −
⋅ = ∑
∈ n
l l n
S v Eff
N S
Sh  
It is notationally convenient to split the formulas of Theorem 1 into two parts, a negative 
swing balance, nsb, and positive swing balance,  psb  such that 
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n
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Thus 
( ) ( ) i psb i nsb i + = δ  
which holds in particular for both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf cases. 16 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
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 in general.] 
We get the following interesting result for Shapley-Shubik efficiency 
Theorem 2 (Efficiency): 
i.  () ∑
=
=
n
i
Sh Sh i psb Eff
1
 
ii.  () ∑
=
− =
n
i
Sh Sh i nsb Eff
1
1  
Proof: 
i.  By induction; [to be inserted]. 
ii. Follows  from  1
01
= ∑
n
i
Sh
i δ  and  ( ) ( ) i psb i nsb i + = δ . 
Corollary: 
The properties of Theorem 2 do not hold for  aB Eff . 
Proof: 
Consider the case of unanimity being required in a game where every voting weight is non-
zero. All votes are needed for the unique winning coalition which has ‘length’ n . So 
n aB Eff
2
1
=  
Likewise, there are exactly n  combinations each with a length of  1 − n  that are the 
corresponding  psb 's. Thus I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 17 
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4.2 Blocking Leverage 
It has become increasingly clear to the author that in assessing voting systems in the EU, 
member states are not only (maybe not even primarily) paying attention to their power as 
assessed by the classical power indices, but are concerned about their ability to block 
(‘veto’) unfavoured decisions. A real analysis of this factor would take into account the 
perceived structure of voting among fellow member states (e.g. to identify ‘allies’); in this 
paper we are concerned with a priori constitutional aspects of voting, and hence we restrict 
our attention to the (partial) blocking strength, or leverage, of each player on its own.  
The concept of blocking power was introduced by Coleman (1971). The Coleman preventive 
power index measures individual voters' possibilities to block a vote. The index is defined as 
the number of winning coalitions where voter is a decisive (negative swing) voter i  divided 
by the number of all winning coalitions. In other words, voter 's negative swings are divided 
by the number of winning coalitions. Formally voter i 's power to block action is calculated as 
() {} ( ) []
() ∑
∑
∈
∈
− −
N S
N S
S v
i S v S v
    [Coleman preventive power] 
Following the above idea, we ask what the probability of a negative swing is, given that 
coalitions are otherwise winning, in the following generalised definition. 
Definition 2 (Blocking Leverage): 
The Blocking Leverage of player i  is   () ( )
Eff
i nsb
i BL = , 
 so that    () ( ) ( )
() ∑
=
= =
n
i
Sh
Sh
Sh
Sh
Sh
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i nsb
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i nsb
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1
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Theorem 3 (Blocking Leverage): 
()= i BLaB Coleman’s preventive power index. 
Proof: 
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The index vector  () { } n i i BLSh ,..., 1 : =  offers more original information than 
() {} n i i BLaB ,..., 1 : =  in the sense that it does not reduce on normalising to  i
Sh
i φ δ = , 
unlike the latter, for which holds 
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where the subscript ‘nB’ stands for ‘normalised Banzhaf’. 
4.3 Example: Calculating Efficiency for QMV of the Council of the EU 
Since the beginning of the Inter-Governmental Conference that followed on from the EU’s 
Constitutional Convention there were continuing reports about member states being in 
favour or opposed to the Double Majority proposal set out in the Draft Constitution. Particular 
prominence was given by acolytes of the Double Majority to the issue of the future efficiency 
of decision making in the Council, in terms of the ease or difficulty of reaching qualified 
majorities. 
As an example, Tabellini (2003) citing Baldwin et al. (2003) claims that “[the Double Majority] 
results in a huge increase in the probability of approving new legislation [i.e. ‘efficiency’] … 
under the rules proposed by the Convention Treaty and with 25 countries, as much as 22 % 
of all possible Council coalitions overcome the majority thresholds. This takes the Union to a 
situation comparable to that of the 1960s, when it consisted of only the six founding member 
states.”  I H S — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — 19 
However, the (Banzhaf) methodology used in those calculations is not appropriate for 
analysing the Council (of Ministers) of the EU, a decision making body mostly seeking 
consensus through negotiation. As we have seen, there are several strong theoretical and 
empirical reasons for preferring the classical approach of Shapley and Shubik. The 
conclusions reached using the two methodologies are usually similar but on crucial 
occasions, as in the case of the Convention’s Double Majority proposal, they are 
dramatically different. In common with many other authors, we consistently calculate indices 
of power based on the Shapley-Shubik approach, The possibility of being able to make the 
calculations of efficiency, such as we present here for the Council, has also recently been 
anticipated in the work of Laruelle and Valenciano (2003). 
The results show that the claims made about the inefficiency of weighted voting in an 
enlarged EU are vastly exaggerated. Whereas the Double Majority proposal of the 
Convention do fare somewhat better in terms of Shapley-Shubik efficiency (39 % in EU25), 
the efficiency of the other (weighted vote) systems hypothetically applied to the EU of 25 
member states remains at or around 30 % (Status Quo+ 30.5 %, ‘Nice’ 29.2 %). In fact this 
level of efficiency – the probability of approving new legislation – is higher than calculated for 
the Double Majority using the Banzhaf-Coleman approach (22.5 %). In the other weighted 
voting cases, the Banzhaf-Coleman calculations produce extraneous results, e.g. Nice 
(3.6 %), Status Quo (3.5 %), which should in our opinion be discarded. 
An intuitive explanation for these differences is as follows: The Banzhaf-Coleman model 
assumes that all members of a voting body act entirely independently of one another, and 
randomly. This at first seemingly innocuous assumption in fact means that as the number of 
voters increases the probability continually increases that just around half of the members 
are in favour of any decision, and half against, so it becomes increasingly difficult to cross a 
threshold usually around a quota of 70 % of total votes. Analogously, in a yes/no referendum 
choice with an electorate of millions, the coalitional probabilities in a Banzhaf-Coleman 
model of such a voting scenario imply that there would always be an almost exact 50/50 split 
for and against – clearly, in behavioural terms, a reductio ad absurdum. 
The better ‘principle of insufficient reason’ assumption is asserted by Shapley-Shubik 
modelling: namely, that there is an equal chance of j member states (j varying from 0 to n  
= 25 in EU25) being in favour of any particular issue, and that every coalitional combination 
made up of j countries is also equally likely within that. Efficiency is then the sum of the 
probabilities, thus determined, of winning coalitions. Not only is the Shapley-Shubik model 
preferable for calculating power, the coalitional probabilities used in the calculation of 
efficiency are not in conflict with behavioural reality. Our results clearly prove that worries 20 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
about efficiency in the enlarged EU are unfounded – it is simply not a decisive factor for the 
choice of voting system, and it cannot hold as the main reason for preferring the Convention 
Double Majority proposal, or indeed the system of “Double Majority+” adopted in the 
Conventional Treaty of the European Union, to a weighted voting arrangement such as the 
Nice system. 
5. Constitutional Power in the European Union 
Calculations of Shapley-Shubik power indices using the method of expected decisiveness 
have been implemented and validated with proprietary software, which also produces the 
new Shapley-Shubik based measures of efficiency and blocking leverage. In this paper, we 
do not focus on evaluating the various proposals that were made by the European 
Commission, European Convention, individual member states, or independent actors in the 
run-up to the debate on the European Constitution, albeit a fascinating topic in itself. Instead 
we present only results for the Status Quo (an interpolation of weighted votes for new 
member states in force until November 1, 2004), the ‘Nice system’ in force thereafter, and 
the Constitutional settlement which will come into force in 2009, after successful ratification 
of the treaty by all member states. (Details of these systems and further analysis may be 
found in the Short Policy Papers at http://www.ihs.ac.at/index.php3?id=1053) 
In Table 1 it may be observed that the redistribution of power towards large member states 
(an ‘upward reform’ in terms of the power gradient) is moderate in the transition from the 
Status Quo to Nice, but is dramatically increased in the transition from Nice to the system of 
the Constitution. We refer here to the Shapley-Shubik results, although the Banzhaf results 
are shown for comparison. Note that power indices are given here as percentages instead of 
on the 0-1 scale. For example, in an EU of 27 members, Germany, the largest EU member 
state, would have a power index of 16.27, only somewhat short of its share of the EU 
population at 17.05  %, Indeed the power gradient shows a very large increase in the 
Constitution (e.g. 86 % in EU”7) over the Nice system of weighted votes (56 % in EU27). 
In contrast, Banzhaf calculations would indicate only a further moderate increase in power 
gradient due to the constitutional settlement. Such a result runs contrary to the effects of the 
Constitutional system of Qualified Majority Voting as perceived by various insiders and 
political commentators to the Inter-Governmental negotiations.
8 While this observation may 
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Sh Power Indices: Shapley-Shubik  norm. Banzhaf Shapley-Shubik  norm. Banzhaf
Population 
(1000's) Country EU15
Share of 
Population SQ Nice
CONSTI
TUTION
Nice
CONSTI
TUTION
Share of 
Population Nice
CONSTI
TUTION
Nice
CONSTI
TUTION
82537 Germany 11.67   18.16 8.30 9.49 15.76     8.56 10.42     17.05 8.73 16.27     7.783 11.87    
59630 France 11.67   13.12 8.30 9.37 10.30     8.56 7.58       12.32 8.71 10.88     7.783 8.74      
59329 UK 11.67   13.05 8.30 9.37 10.25     8.56 7.54       12.25 8.71 10.82     7.783 8.69      
57321 Italy 11.67   12.61 8.30 9.37 9.88       8.56 7.38       11.84 8.71 10.41     7.783 8.44      
41551 Spain 9.55     9.14 6.51 8.67 7.05       8.12 5.82       8.58 8.03 7.37       7.42 6.37      
38219 Poland 8.41 6.51 8.67 6.65       8.12 5.56       7.89 8.03 6.81       7.42 5.89      
21773 Romania 4.50 3.98 4.21       4.259 4.22      
16193 Netherlands 5.52     3.56 3.97 3.95 3.49       4.23 3.76       3.34 3.69 3.26       3.974 3.50      
11018 Greece 5.52     2.42 3.97 3.61 2.78       3.91 3.33       2.28 3.39 2.42       3.684 2.88      
10408 Portugal 5.52     2.30 3.97 3.61 2.70       3.91 3.29       2.15 3.39 2.32       3.684 2.80      
10356 Belgium 5.52     2.28 3.97 3.61 2.69       3.91 3.29       2.14 3.39 2.32       3.684 2.80      
10203 Czech  2.25 3.97 3.61 2.67       3.91 3.25       2.11 3.39 2.29       3.684 2.78      
10142 Hungary 2.23 3.97 3.61 2.66       3.91 3.25       2.10 3.39 2.28       3.684 2.77      
8941 Sweden 4.54     1.97 3.25 2.99 2.50       3.27 3.18       1.85 2.82 2.09       3.093 2.63      
8067 Austria 4.54     1.78 3.25 2.99 2.38       3.27 3.10       1.67 2.82 1.95       3.093 2.52      
7846 Bulgaria 1.62 2.82 1.92       3.093 2.49      
5384 Denmark 3.53     1.18 2.34 2.07 2.00       2.31 2.88       1.11 1.95 1.52       2.181 2.19      
5379 Slovakia 1.18 2.34 2.07 2.00       2.31 2.88       1.11 1.95 1.52       2.181 2.19      
5206 Finland 3.53     1.15 2.34 2.07 1.98       2.31 2.84       1.08 1.95 1.50       2.181 2.17      
3964 Ireland 3.53     0.87 2.34 2.07 1.82       2.31 2.76       0.82 1.95 1.31       2.181 2.02      
3463 Lithuania 0.76 2.34 2.07 1.75       2.31 2.73       0.72 1.95 1.23       2.181 1.96      
2332 Latvia 0.51 2.34 1.17 1.60       1.33 2.61       0.48 1.09 1.05       1.25 1.82      
1995 Slovenia 0.44 2.34 1.17 1.56       1.33 2.58       0.41 1.09 1.00       1.25 1.78      
1356 Estonia 0.30 2.34 1.17 1.47       1.33 2.54       0.28 1.09 0.90       1.25 1.70      
715 Cyprus 0.16 1.57 1.17 1.38       1.33 2.50       0.15 1.09 0.80       1.25 1.62      
448 Luxembourg 2.07     0.10 1.57 1.17 1.34       1.33 2.46       0.09 1.09 0.76       1.25 1.59      
397 Malta 0.09 1.57 0.88 1.34       0.99 2.46       0.08 0.83 0.75       0.942 1.58      
47.0% 43.2% 56.7% 73.3% 49.1% 41.2% 56.2% 86.1% 47.5% 59.0%
Source: IHS PG
EU27
Power Gradients Power Gradients
EU25
not have scientific value, it indicates that the Banzhaf results may have certain difficulty in 
acceptance by interested parties. 
Table 1: The Power Distribution now, and under the Constitution of the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Power Gradient 
The Power Gradient chart is shown illustratively for the Double Majority proposed by the 
European Convention in 2003 in the figure below. The Power Gradient is calculated as the 
upper shaded area (between the plot of cumulated power and cumulated equal power) as a 
percentage of the whole shaded area (bounded on the lower side by the plot of cumulated 
power equal to cumulated population). Further details may be found in Paterson (1998) and 
Paterson and Silárszky (1999). 22 — Iain Paterson / Voting Power Derives from the Poll Distribution — I H S 
Power Gradient for 'Convention proposal'
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The power gradient as a non-parametric measure which may be regarded as belonging to a 
general class of measures we refer to as a coefficient of representation.
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition Coefficient of Representation: 
 A Coefficient of Representation  R c  is: 
P C
P C V
n c S R
'
'
1
1− =  
where  
' 1  is the n  row-vector {} 1 ... , 1 , 1  
   '
S V  is the n  row-vector of shares of a representation variable (e.g. votes, 
  power,  GDP,  …) 
  P is the n  vector of the represented variable (e.g. populations), in  
  ascending  order 
  n  is the number of elements (e.g. states) 
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6. Conclusion 
In addition to a different formulation of the Shapley-Shubik index, which offers alternative 
computational options, the approach in this paper shows that voting power, expressed as 
indices of expected decisiveness, is a unifying concept that encompasses the classical 
Shapley-Shubik and (absolute) Banzhaf indices (and potentially many others). The difference 
in these measures lies solely in the underlying distribution of the voting poll, i.e. the number 
(or fraction, percentage) of voters in favour of a decision. The approach is related to that of 
Straffin (1977) but focuses on the poll distribution outcomes instead of behavioural 
assumptions concerning voters’ probability of voting in favour. 
Empirical evidence from elections shows grounds for clearly rejecting a binomial distribution 
of the poll (the Banzhaf model), particularly in those situations, as in the EU Council of 
Ministers, where there is no reason from first principles for poll outcomes not to be at the low 
or high end of the scale. Straffin (1977) pointed out that the Banzhaf (binomial) outcome 
occurs when each decision-maker (voter, player) is independent of (perhaps oblivious, we 
suggest, to the opinion of) the other decision-makers. We consider this not to apply in the 
consensus-seeking European Union, nor indeed in any committee or electorate that 
discusses issues thoroughly before making a genuine group decision, (c.f. Straffin’s 
‘homogeneity of probabilities’).  
1
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We reject the “square-root rule” as a theoretical device: it is a corollary of the Banzhaf 
approach, itself untenable in the light of consideration of the poll distribution. Its application 
to vote weighting would not be wrong per se. It is one particular compromise between two 
extremes of the power gradient, but it cannot be claimed as being the uniquely fair and 
democratic solution to vote weighting and qualified majority systems.  
Our approach enables the formulation of the related Shapley-Shubik measures, efficiency 
and blocking leverage, which have been shown to be of considerable interest to policy 
makers in the discussion process that led to the acceptance of the European Constitution, 
notwithstanding the circumstance that such advice has until now been based tacitly on the 
underlying questionable assumptions of the Banzhaf approach. 
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